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ARTICLES

THE "RIGHT" TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR
PATENT INFRINGEMENT
James M. Fischert
Abstract
Last term, in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Court
"seemingly" rejected the Federal Circuit's longstandingpractice of
awarding permanent injunctive relief as a matter of course on the
patentee establishing actual infringement. The Court concluded that
federal courts should evaluate the availability of injunctive relief to
redress continuing, actual infringement based on the traditionalfourpart test. This paper explores the Court's approach to injunctive
relief in patent litigation. I argue that eBay supports an integrative
view of Patent Act remedies that merges the availabilityof injunctive
relief to the type of damages (royalties or lost profits) the patentee
can claim under the Patent Act. In a nutshell, injunctive relief should
ordinarilybe limited to cases when the patentee seeks lost profits. In
cases when the patentee seeks statutory royalties, injunctive relief
should ordinarily be denied on the ground that the remedy at law is
adequate.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Litigation is serious business. Vast sums are wagered in the
effort to persuade a tribunal to rule in favor of one party. In some
instances, litigation is so central to the success or failure of an
enterprise that the euphemism "bet the company" has arisen as a gloss
on the stakes at play.' Patent litigation has recently become part of
2
this "bet the company" phenomenon, particularly with the emergence
of the "0bermensch" of patent litigation - the "patent troll":
Meet a new breed of entrepreneurs: patent trolls. Proponents
assert that patent trolls are entitled to extract value from
underutilized patented technologies. Critics contend that they are
the ambulance chasers of the new millennium. Patent trolls have
inverted the traditional rationale for building an intellectual
property ("IP") portfolio. They obtain patents, not to make, use, or
sell new products and technologies, but solely to force third parties
to purchase licenses. Instead of investing capital to develop
inventions, patent trolls wait for the industry to utilize a patented
technology and then enforce their patents on the alleged infringers.
And because patent trolls have no incentive to reach business
solutions, target companies are left with two options: pay up or
litigate. 3
The continued success of patent trolling was before the Court
this last term in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.4 The dispute
addressed what on the surface appears to be a simple issue - is a party
who has prevailed on the merits and has demonstrated that its patent
is being infringed entitled to an injunction? It is, or at least "used to
be," pretty close to hornbook law that injunctions are appropriate

1.

As is the case with euphemisms, there is a tendency to exaggerate. See Charles Silver,

"We're Scared to Death ": Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1414

(2003) (noting that losses are often covered by insurance or a claim for insurance).
2.
Peter 0. Huang, The Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc.:
The Return of PatentAppeals to the Regional Circuits, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 197, 202-03
(2003)

Another reason patent cases are very challenging is that they often are highpressure, 'bet the company' cases. Patent litigants can expect to invest at least
half a million dollars, and perhaps ten or twelve times that amount, just in taking
a patent case through trial. The expenses associated with an appeal only add to
this already high total.
(footnotes omitted).
3.
Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP.
L. BULL. 1, 1 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
4.

eBay Inc. v, MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
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remedies to remedy infringement of patent rights.5 It is this
connection between right and remedy that gives patent trolls the
power to force settlements from an infringer - purchase immunity
from the injunction or cease infringing and therefore see profits
plummet or the business fail.
The Court's decision in eBay did not resolve the patent troll
problem - if it is a problem6

-

as some had hoped.7 The Court in a

5. Historically, the connection between adjudications of infringement and injunctions to
abate continued infringements has been unquestioned. Professor Chisum devotes an entire
volume of his multivolume treatise on patents to the subject of remedies. Yet, within those 761
pages, only three lines of text and a single, albeit extensive, footnote are devoted to permanent
injunctions: "A patent owner prevailing on the merits of a patent infringement claim will usually
be granted a permanent injunction against future infringement unless the public interest
otherwise dictates." 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.04[2] (2002) (footnote

omitted). The omitted footnote cites decisions noting or applying the public policy exception to
the usual practice of granting a permanent injunction to cease patent infringement.
6. E.g., Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1559, 1562 (2006) (reviewing ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION
AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004)). Professor Dreyfuss comments:

But as bad as the raw numbers are, the problem is aggravated by the increased
power associated with these patents. The authors demonstrate that in the last two
decades, the probability that a patent will be found valid and infringed has risen
substantially. Furthermore, there is greater likelihood that permanent injunctions
and substantial monetary damages will be awarded. With increasing confidence
in the efficacy of patent litigation, new business strategies have emerged.
Because patents are now more attractive than other ways of appropriating the
benefits of inventiveness (such as relying on first-mover advantages), firms that
might once have allowed their advances to fall into the public domain instead tie
down new technologies with patents. Furthermore, the prospect of a rich award
or settlement leads firms to look for "Rembrandts in the Attic" to assert against
their rivals. Indeed, there are now "patent trolls"-firms whose only business is
to hold up established companies and force them to pay hefty fees.
Id. at 1562 (footnote omitted). Not all commentators share the view that patent trolls are a
scourge upon the land. See Katherine E. White, Preserving the Patent Process to Incentivize
Innovation in Global Economy, 2006 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 2 (2006):
To date, attacks on patent trolls persist without significant opposition. Certainly,
individuals exist who abuse the patent system. That, however, is not a reason to
write laws solely favoring manufacturers at the expense of promoting innovation.
Preferring one type of inventor over another may have the unintended
consequence of cooling inventive activity. After all, "[o]ne man's independent
inventor is another's predator."
7. Initially, the Court in granting certiorari asked the parties to brief the issue of the
continuing vitality of Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405
(1908), which upheld an award of injunctive relief to a patent holder who was not practicing the
patent. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005). This request suggested to
some that the use of patent litigation as a negotiating strategy by patent trolls might be curtailed.
The Court, however, did not reconsider Continental Paper Bag, except to note that the district
court's decision was in tension with Continental Paper Bag. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006). See infra notes 115-117 and accompanying text.
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unanimous outcome, but at the same time fractured decision,8 decided
that issuing injunctive relief to redress an adjudicated infringement of
a patent rests in the sound discretion of courts. 9 That itself was a
significant statement given the tradition of granting injunctive relief
practically as a matter of course to prevent future or continuing
infringement.
This paper argues that judicial discretion should be exercised
with an awareness of the statutory allowance of damages, but not
restitution, in the Patent Act. The injunctive relief provided by the
Patent Act should be limited to that necessary to protect the patentee's
right to damages for infringement, either a reasonable royalty or lost
profits, and not as leverage to exact part of the infringer's gains.
When the patentee seeks lost profits the difficulties of proof, coupled
with the patentee's right to exploit its own work for profit, should
ordinarily result in the awarding of injunctive relief to prevent
continuing and proven infringement. When the patentee seeks only a
reasonable royalty however, monetary relief will adequately
compensate the patentee. Awarding injunctive relief resembles
disgorgement of the infringer's profit - a remedy denied under the
Patent Act.

II.

THE DECISION IN EBAY

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., involved a claim by
MercExchange that eBay was violating a process patent' ° that
MercExchange held. The jury found a violation and awarded
damages. 1 A damages award allows the infringer to calculate whether
it is more efficient to violate the patent and pay damages or respect
the patent and not pay. That part of the decision was not at issue.
What was at issue was the award of injunctive relief to bar eBay from

8. Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for the Court. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a
concurrence, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence
joined by Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter. Justice Alito did not participate.
9. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
10. Process patents have generated substantial controversy. At its root, a process patent is
just a patent that protects a way of doing something rather than the something itself (which
would be a product patent). See CHISUM, supra note 5, § 1.03[1]. The problem is in defining the
scope of the process that is patentable. For example, software patents are generally based on
mathematical processes (algorithms). Yet one cannot claim a patent on math or on mathematical
formulas in general. The problem is where to draw the line. See John LaBarre & Xavier G6mezVelasco, Ready, Set, Mark Your PatentedSoftware!, 12 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 3, 18-20 (2005).
11.
eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839.
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continuing to infringe on MercExchange's patent.12 The injunctive
relief raises the stakes by adding to the consequences of violation the14
13
sanction of contempt, which may be civil, criminal, or both.
Because contempt sanctions can be draconian,' 5 the provision of
injunctive relief is usually effective in ending continuing violations of
the patentee's legal entitlement.
In the opinion for the Court, Justice Thomas noted the
longstanding tradition in equity that an injunction, entered at the
conclusion of plenary proceedings, should satisfy a four-part test:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test
before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity
is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved
16
by a permanent injunction.

12. The Patent Act provides for injunctive relief on the establishment of infringement. 35
U.S.C. § 283 (2000) ("The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.").
13. Gunn v. Univ. Comm. to End the War in Vietnam, 399 U.S. 383, 389 (1970) ("An
injunctive order is an extraordinary writ, enforceable by the power of contempt.").
14. A sanction of both criminal and civil contempt does not violate the double jeopardy
clause. United States v. Marquardo, 149 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Hughey,
571 F.2d 11I, 114-16 (2d Cir. 1978). Similarly, a person may be subject to both coercive and
compensatory civil contempt. Perfect Fit Indus. Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 673 F.2d 53, 56-57
(2d Cir. 1982) (noting that sanctions imposed on contemnor may properly serve to coerce future
compliance or to remedy past noncompliance); United States v. Asay, 614 F.2d 655, 659 (9th
Cir. 1980) ("Under the sanction test if the purpose of the relief is to compel the respondent to
comply or to compensate the petitioner for the refusal, the contempt proceeding is civil in
nature. If the purpose is to punish the respondent and vindicate the court, the proceeding is
criminal."). On the differences between criminal, coercive, and compensatory contempt, see
JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 191 (2d ed. 2006).
15.
Contempt sanctions can include imprisonment or fine on an adjudication of criminal
contempt and open-ended imprisonment or fines on an adjudication of civil contempt until the
contemptuous conduct (e.g., disobedience of the court order) is discontinued. FISCHER, supra
note 14, § 194.2 (coercive imprisonment), § 194.4 (coercive fine). Recoveries for compensatory
contempt largely duplicate those available under the general law of remedies. Id. at § 195
(compensatory contempt).
16.
eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839. The opinion did not cite or reference the judicial tradition of
awarding injunctions as a general practice on a finding of infringement. See CHISUM supra note
5; cf Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that a
presumption attaches that the plaintiff patentee will suffer irreparable harm from continuing
infringement once plaintiff establishes likelihood of success on its claim of infringement).
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The opinion stated that the Patent Act did not authorize a
departure from the traditional test.' 7 Therefore, both the district
court's reluctance to consider injunctive relief in the face of a jury
finding of infringement,' 8 and the court of appeals' embracing of
injunctive relief when there was a finding of infringement,1 9 failed to
address the requirements for the traditional test of issuing an
injunction. The Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and
remanded the matter to the district court for reconsideration whether
an injunction would be appropriate under the traditional four-part
test. z"
Some of the hidden tension in Justice Thomas's opinion for the
Court can be discerned in each of the short concurrences. Chief
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, while not
overtly disagreeing with the concept that an injunction is a
discretionary equitable remedy, emphasized that discretion is bounded
here by principle and precedent:
[T]here is a difference between exercising equitable discretion
pursuant to the established four-factor test and writing on an
entirely clean slate. "Discretion is not a whim, and limiting
discretion according to legal standards helps promote the basic
principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike." When
it comes to discerning and applying those standards, 2in this area as
others, "a page of history is worth a volume of logic." '
The Chief Justice's concurrence did not develop how the precedent in
this field should be interpreted and applied in addressing the
availability of the remedy of injunctive relief in cases of actual
infringement.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer,
also penned a short concurrence that questioned the use of a remedy
(i.e., injunctions) in patent litigation to leverage positions in
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1838-39.
Id. at 1840.
Id.at 1841.
Id. at 1838.
Id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (quoting Justice Holmes' opinion for the

Court in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921)). The Holmesian adage is,

however, better suited to explain a doctrine's development than as a justification for that
development, for as Holmes also noted:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from

blind imitation of the past.
0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,469 (1897).
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negotiations over patent licensing fees. In Justice Kennedy's view,
this use of a remedy could lead to socially undesirable results that
courts should neither ignore nor countenance:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the
product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations,
legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest. In
addition injunctive relief may have different consequences for the
burgeoning number of patents over business methods, which were
not of much economic and legal significance in earlier times. The
potential vagueness and suspect validity of some22 of these patents
may affect the calculus under the four-factor test.
In the opinion for the Court, Justice Thomas noted the interplay
and potential antagonism between right and remedy: "But the creation
of a right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of
that right., 2 3 The opinion did not further develop the theme and at
first incorrectly suggests an adversarial dialectic. Rights and remedies
are necessarily symbiotic. The award, which is the product of
litigation, is the result of the interaction between right and remedy;
both are necessary and neither alone is sufficient.
It is common, nonetheless, to state the rights created by the
patent grant demanded in remediation when the right is violated.24
The difficulty lies not in the statement but in its implementation.
Remedies complement rights in the sense that remedies are designed
to vindicate rights and undo the harm that results from violation of
rights. 25 Identifying the proper remedy requires calculating how best
the right can be vindicated and how best the harm can be rectified.
For example, an award of damages is often seen as a natural corollary
to a rights violation. The damages award represents both the societal
expression of respect for the right and the effort to compensate the

22. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id.at 1840. See also Yixin H. Tang, Note, The Future of Patent Enforcement After
23.
eBay v. MercExchange, 20 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 235, 241-43 (2006) (noting tension among the
several opinions for the "unanimous" Court).
24. This is perhaps best known by the refrain "for every wrong there is a remedy," which
dates at least as far back as William Blackstone. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (Wayne Morrison ed., Cavendish Publ'g Ltd. 2001).
25.
I DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 1.1 (2d ed.
1993); FISCHER, supra note 14, § 1.
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right holder for the harm sustained as a result of the violation. 26 Yet
the conduct that caused the right violation may have redeeming
societal value; therefore, the right may enjoy only limited protection
and redress.2 7 The right itself may also enjoy only limited recognition
and be burdened with glosses that limit when a violation will be
recognized. 28
When we expand the consideration of remedies beyond damages
to include injunctions, we add several additional complicating factors.
First, there is the traditional view that, as a form of equitable relief,
injunctions are mostly supplemental remedies to damages.29 Second,
is the likewise traditional view that injunctive relief, as an equitable
remedy that is available as a matter of discretion and not entitlement,
may not issue even when legal rights have been violated.30
26.

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (3d

ed. 2002) ("The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured party, as nearly as
possible, to the position he would have been in had it not been for the wrong .... ").
27. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 860 (1999) (discussing competing viewpoints as to whether constitutional rights are
corrupted by the practical need to be expressed in a remedial format or whether constitutional
rights and their corresponding remedial expression are complimentary and coequal); John C.
Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L. J. 87, 90 (1999)
(arguing that limiting damages to cases involving both constitutional violations and fault, but
allowing injunctive relief for constitutional violations regardless of fault, encourages a broad
development of constitutional rights; limiting remedies encourages innovation in the field of
constitutional rights by reducing the costs of the law's development).
28. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 620 (2004) (holding that to recover statutory damages for
violation of the Federal Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000)) the plaintiff must demonstrate an
actual injury resulting from the violation).
29.

THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 673 (5th

ed. 1956):
Equity is often spoken of as a supplement or an appendix to the common law;

a mediaeval lawyer would perhaps have caught our meaning better if we were to
say that it is a sort of gloss written by later hands around an ancient and
venerable text. Law books were particularly apt to accumulate such glosses
(Coke's gloss on Littleton is the latest English example). In a sense, the gloss and
the text are a unity, an expanded version of the original, and the two must be read
together. This does not mean, however, that there may not be conflict and
contradiction between text and gloss; still less does it mean that there will be a
logical and systematic distribution of material between the text and the gloss. It is
commonly observed, however, that the gloss tends to grow in importance. It may
corrupt the text at points; it will often be clearer, representing a later state of
learning with new facts, and more elaborate thought. It often happened in the end
that the gloss was of more practical importance than the original.
The process of development and relationship between law and equity is also concisely discussed
in 4 SIR JOHN BAKER, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 39-48 (Oxford
University Press 2003) (1483-1558).
30. PLUCKNETT, supra note 29, at 692; Thomas 0. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U.
CIN. L. REV. 329, 375 (2005).
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On the other hand, federal courts traditionally treat a statute
containing an express remedy of injunctive relief as representing an
implied finding by Congress that violations of the statute harm the
public interest and should be enjoined. 3' This principle has been
applied across a broad range of decisions; 32 however, in Amoco
Production Co. v. Village of Gambel, the Court cast some doubt on
the continuing vitality of this doctrine:
The Court of Appeals did not dispute that the Secretary could
meaningfully comply with ANILCA [Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act] § 810 in conjunction with his review of
production and development plans. Instead, the court stated that
"[irreparable] damage is presumed when an agency fails to
evaluate thoroughly the environmental impact of a proposed
action." This presumption is contrary to traditional equitable
principles and has no basis in ANILCA.
Although this point was not directly addressed in any of the opinions
in eBay, the emphasis in Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court on
the use of the traditional four-part test suggests that the Court would
now reject judicial remedies
presuming injunctive relief unless
34
clear.
was
intent
Congress'
To note that equitable relief is a supplemental remedy or subject
to judicial discretion is not to say that injunctions are second order,
mercurial remedies available according to the vagaries of the court.
This was the central point of Chief Justice Robert's concurrence in
eBay3 5 Precedent, rules, and settled doctrine cabin and control the

31.

See United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31 (1940)
The equitable doctrines relied on do not militate against the capacity of a court of
equity as a proper forum in which to make a declared policy of Congress
effective. Injunction to prohibit continued use-in violation of that policy-of
property granted by the United States, and to enforce the grantee's covenants, is
both appropriate and necessary.
32.
See, e.g., United States v. Estate Preservation Servs., 202 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir.
2000) ("The traditional requirements for equitable relief need not be satisfied since Section 7408
[Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7408] expressly authorizes the issuance of an injunction.");
cf Video Trip Corp. v. Lighting Video, Inc., 866 F.2d 50, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating that
irreparable injury is presumed when the plaintiffs demonstrates a prima facie case of copyright
infringement).
33.
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill, of Gambel, 480 U.S. 531, 544-45 (1987) (citation omitted).
34. id. at 542-43 (discussing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) and
TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
35. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. The point is accepted in the case law.
Yuba Consol. Gold Fields v. Kilkeary, 206 F.2d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1953) ("Equity jurisdiction
being recognized, the question whether it will be exercised rests in the sound discretion of the
chancellor. It must be a legal discretion based on principles of law and not on the arbitrary will
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SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 1.J.

[Vol. 24

availability of equitable remedies, much as damages are calibrated
and awarded on the law side.
Although eBay may be a unanimous opinion of the Court, the
actual result is more uncertain. Only Justice Thomas unequivocally
accepts the position expressed in the opinion for the Court that the
availability of injunctive relief is solely a matter of judicial discretion
guided by the traditional four-part test. 36 For all of the other Justices it
is a "Yes But"; 37 the question is which gets more emphasis, the Yes or
the But? To answer that question one needs to revisit the eBay
opinions and examine them more thoroughly.
III.

THE TRADITIONAL TEST FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

There was no disagreement among the Justices that the
traditional rule in equity for granting injunctive relief is the four-part
test. 3 8 Because of the posture of the case - both the district court and
court of appeals had applied different exogenous glosses on the
traditional test - the Court did not need to go further than reject the
glosses, which it did. 39 However it is important to recognize that the
glosses applied by the lower courts are each available endogenously
by analysis and application of one or more of the factors from the
traditional test.
Traditionally, equitable relief (e.g., an injunction) has been
withheld unless the plaintiff could show that the remedy at law (e.g.,

of the chancellor."). See infra notes 64-80 and accompanying text (discussing role of judicial

discretion and the granting of equitable relief)..
36.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1838 (2006).

37.

id. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., concurring), 1843 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

38. Unfortunately, the test as set forth by Justice Thomas continues the confusing practice
of treating irreparable injury and inadequacy of the remedy at law as distinct factors; they are
not. See, e.g., I IA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2944 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that "[p]robably the most common
method of demonstrating that there is no adequate legal remedy is by showing that plaintiff will
suffer irreparable harm if the court does not intervene .. "); cf Apple Glen Crossing, L.L.C. v.
Trademark Retail, Inc., 784 N.E.2d 484, 487 (Ind. 2003) ("To obtain a preliminary injunction,
the moving party has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the
movant's remedies at law are inadequate, thus causing irreparable harm pending resolution of
the substantive action .... "). Some commentators distinguish between use of the term
irreparable injury to refer to prejudgment equitable remedies and inadequacy of the remedy at
law to refer to remedies available at the time of final judgment. OWEN M. FISS & DOUG
RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 59 (2d ed. 1984). The distinction is noted as being technical. See
LAYCOCK, supra note 26, at 370-71 (noting the Fiss & Rendleman distinction and stating that
the distinction is "artificial").
39. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840-41.
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monetary damages) was inadequate. 40 The concept, also known as
4
irreparable injury,H
was designed to police the boundary between the
separate court systems that developed in England and which were
subsequently transposed to America during the colonial period.42
Thus, the irreparable injury requirement was not applied to claims
within equity's core jurisdiction, such as claims involving trust
misfeasance, but was applied to claims over which the dual legal
systems could each claim jurisdiction.4 3 With the merger of the two
legal systems, the historical reason for the irreparable injury
requirement disappeared,4 4 but the requirement remains nonetheless.4 5
The arguments for retaining the requirement are several-fold. First,
the merger of law and equity is seen as formal and procedural, not
substantive. Thus the policies that warrant sublimating equitable
remedies to legal remedies remain in place notwithstanding merger.46
Second, equitable remedies, particularly injunctions, are an especially
intrusive involvement into, and interference with, the day-to-day lives
of defendants given that non-compliance with an injunction subjects

40.
Hillsborough TP. v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 622 (1946) ( "[S]uits in equity shall not
be sustained in the federal courts 'in any case where a plain, adequate, and complete remedy
may be had at law."') (citing former 28 U.S.C. § 384 (1946)). The provision was repealed in the
1948 revision of the Judiciary Code and the adoption of 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1946 & Supp. 1950);
nonetheless, the Court has recognized that the idea that equity will stay its hand when the
remedy at law is plain, adequate, and complete states a traditional doctrine. See e.g., Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 107-08 (1981).
41.
See supra note 38 (discussing convergence of the two concepts).
42.
FISCHER, supranote 14, § 21.1 ("This requirement originated at an early date to avoid
conflicts between the Chancellor and the Royal Judges. As independent yet parallel systems of
dispute resolution the two courts needed principels of coexistence that would govern their
relationship.") (footnote omitted).
43.

Id.
Coexistence between equity and the common law courts led to equity's
jurisdiction being divided into two categories. In the first category were those
matters that had historically and traditionally been heard in equity. These
included matters involving fiduciaries, which arose out of equity's long-standing
and recognized jurisdiction over "uses," fraud, mistake, and bankruptcy, to name
but a few. Here, equity's jurisdiction was primary and a party was not required to
demonstrate that his remedy at law was inadequate. This primary jurisdiction is
still recognized.
44.
Byron v. Clay, 867 F.2d 1049, 1052 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[W]ith the merger of law and
equity, it is difficult to see why equitable defenses should be limited to equitable suits any
more ....").
45.
DOBBS, supra note 25, § 2.5 (discussing debate over utility of irreparable injury rule
and noting the continued use of the rule).
46.
Ashley v. Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co., 66 F.3d 164, 168-69 (8th Cir. 1995)
(noting that decisions allowing equitable defenses to be asserted against legal claims have been
limited to legal claims that have an origin in equity).
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equitable

over-deter

and

overcompensate a party for losses caused by the defendant's
wrongdoing. 48 This is inconsistent with the basic remedies principle
that the injured party should be restored to the position he would have
realized in the absence of the wrongdoing, not a superior position.49
The continued retention of the irreparable injury requirement has
been criticized.50 The criticism has, however, had little demonstrable
impact on continued judicial recognition of the irreparable injury as a

requirement for injunctive relief.
IV.

THE TRADITIONAL TEST AS APPLIED IN EBAY

Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court found that the district
court appeared to adopt certain expansive principles suggesting that
injunctive relief could not issue in a broad swath of cases." The
opinion focused on comments made by the district court that the
patentee's willingness to license its patents and the patentee's lack of
commercial activity in practicing the patents would be sufficient to

47.
LAYCOCK, supra note 26, at 371-72 (noting concern but arguing that it should be
examined in the context of respecting the plaintiffs liberty to exercise her rights that the
defendant is infringing).
48.
For example, injunctions may benefit non-parties thus raising the cost of compliance
to the defendant. Bailey v. Patterson, 323 F.2d 201, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1963) (enjoining
discriminatory policy of common carrier and requiring that all passengers be treated equally).
See also Larkin v. Michigan Dept. of Soc. Services, 89 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding
injunction enjoining state from enforcing statute restricting location of adult foster care homes
and requiring neighbor notification, without limiting the injunction benefits to the named
parties); cf Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bush, 261 F.3d 1037 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming contempt
citation based on failure of defendants to provide relief to non-parties consistent with relief court
order to be provided to parties; order was intended to provide system-wide remedy even though
claim was not certified as class action). In some instances, the injunction may be designed to
overcompensate the plaintiff to insure that the plaintiff receives adequate protection, the socalled prophylactic injunction. David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure ofan Injunction: A Principle
to Replace Balancing the Equitiesand Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627, 678 (1988)
(noting that a properly tailored injunction may sometimes contain terms that go beyond the
plaintiffs rightful position to avoid falling short of it).
49.
Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) (stating that injunctive relief should
only be as burdensome as necessary to restore the plaintiff to the position she would have
occupied had the wrongful conduct not occurred).
50.
Douglas Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687
(1990). But see Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an
Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 346, 349-52 (1981) (arguing that the requirement serves
important interests, namely the plaintiffs right is too valuable to allow the defendant to breach a
duty to respect plaintiffs right. The right protects something that is not easily replaceable, i.e., is
unique, or monetizing the injury caused by the violation of plaintiff's right may be difficult).
51.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
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52
establish that the patentee would not suffer irreparable injury.
Justice Thomas's opinion for the Court concluded that such an
approach was inconsistent with traditional equitable principles. 53 The
opinion cited no authority for its position. In fact, the issue is more
nuanced than Justice Thomas's opinion suggests.
Courts have recognized that the irreparable injury requirement
should receive a practical, not a wooden application. 54 Thus, the
prototypical case for finding irreparable injury is the seller's breach of
a contract to convey realty. Under the rubric that each piece of realty
is unique, damages cannot restore the disappointed buyer to her
rightful position because damages will not allow her to buy exactly
what she lost. In those cases, courts have allowed the buyer to obtain
injunctive relief (specific performance) on the contract to convey the
property.55 This idea of "uniqueness" expresses a fundamental aspect
of the irreparable injury requirement - the remedy at law is adequate
if the award of damages will enable the defendant to purchase a
substitute that is essentially the same or equal to what was promised
under the contract. 56 When a substitute is not present, specific
performance is. Thus, if the buyer wishes to acquire the property only
to resell it for a profit, courts have treated this situation as one where
the remedy at law (damages) is adequate because it gives the plaintiff
what he wanted from the transaction - monetary profit. 57 This is,

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. This was the main theme of Professor Laycock's seminal paper on the irreparable
injury rule. Laycock, supra note 50, passim (noting that courts apply the irreparable injury
concept in a pragmatic, functional manner that is inconsistent with the concept itself). Professor
Laycock's paper generated some academic responses, but the criticisms were largely at the
margins rather than with Laycock's main thesis.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e (1981) (stating that specific
performance was usual remedy for seller's breach of a contract to sell real property because each
parcel of realty was deemed to be unique, i.e., it could not be replaced by a substitute of like
kind and quality. Some courts have questioned whether this concept is always applicable, but
these cases have involved claims by disappointed sellers for specific performance, not
disappointed buyers. In the latter case, the common law presumption that each piece of real
property is unique remains inviolate even if the property is lot #347 of 1500 similar lots in the
"Levittown" development). For a critique of the "uniqueness" concept, see Nancy Perkins
Spyke, What's Land Got to Do With It?: Rhetoric and Indeterminacy in Land's FavoredLegal
Status, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 387, 391-98 (2004) (as applied to contracts for the sale of real
property).
56. DOBBS, supra note 25, § 2.5(2).
57. Miller v. LeSea Broad., Inc., 87 F.3d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Wisconsin
law) ("In a case in which, although the contract is for the sale of an entire business, the buyer's
negotiations to resell the property enable his loss from the breach to the exactly monetized, the
case for specific performance collapses.") (citations omitted); Klein v. PepsiCo, 845 F.2d 76, 80
(4th 1988):
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admittedly, a disputed proposition. Not all courts accept the position
that the plaintiff should be required to accept a substitute.58 As a
practical matter, the dispute in the case law illustrates the real world
discretionary nature of the equitable remedy because respectable
arguments can be made on each side of the irreparable injury issue.
There is nothing particularly controversial or surprising about the
district court's position that monetary damages would be a sufficient

remedy if the patentee's true objective was to secure monetary
compensation by licensing the patent as opposed to practicing the
patent. The principal has been applied in patent infringement actions,

albeit

in the

context of preliminary rather than

permanent

injunctions. 59 However, this is more the product of awarding
permanent injunctions as a matter of right when an infringement has
been found rather than a principled distinction between the two forms
of injunctive relief. Of course, the patentee will prefer a contrary
construction of the issue as involving the absolute and inviolate right
to exclude others from use of one's property without consent, 60 which
We note first that Virginia's adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code does
not abrogate the maxim that specific performance is inappropriate where
damages are recoverable and adequate. In this case Judge Williams repeatedly
stated that money damages would make Klein whole. Klein argued that he
wanted the plane to resell it for a profit. Finally, an increase in the cost of a
replacement does not merit the remedy of specific performance. There is no room
in this case for the equitable remedy of specific performance.
(citations omitted).
58. Justus v. Clelland, 651 P.2d 1206, 1207-08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting full
compensation theory as justification to disappointed buyer); Sedmak v. Charlie's Chevrolet,
Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding specific performance of contract to sell automobile that was not unique
when buyers would be put to considerable expense, trouble, delay, and inconvenient to acquire a
substitute).
59.
To obtain a preliminary injunction in a patent infringement suit, the plaintiff
must establish that he will suffer irreparable injury during the litigation if such an
injunction is denied. As Professor McCarthy notes, the "'irreparable injury'
requirement is merely a specific application of the general doctrine that equitable
relief cannot be granted unless plaintiff shows that the remedy at law is
inadequate." Thus, a plaintiff will suffer no irreparable injury if he or she can
obtain full compensation through the legal remedy of an award of money
damages after a full trial.
CHISUM, supra note 5, § 20.04 [1][e] (footnote omitted). The status of intellectual property as
"property" has been contentious. See Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual
Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 715 (1993). The Court in eBay avoided direct
confrontation with the issue. See Tang, supra note 23, at 244-45.
60. Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 643 (1947)
("A patent is a species of property. It gives the patentee or his assignee the 'exclusive right to
make, use, and vend the invention or discovery' for a limited period.") (citation omitted). See
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has been a traditional justification for the providing of injunctive
relief.6' Therefore, the critical question should be whether the
patentee's construction of the issue should be preferred, particularly
when, as here, the "property" right at issue is one of statutory creation
that reflects a complex mix of competing values. Justice Thomas's
opinion never really addresses this issue; rather, the opinion discusses
in an abstract manner the connected issue regarding how the district
court should evaluate the awarding of injunctive relief.62 On that
point, the Court opted for a case-by-case approach: "[t]o the extent
that the district court adopted such a categorical rule, then, its
decision cannot be squared with the principles of equity." 63 How is
also Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919) (holding that an injunction should issue
when the intervention of a court of equity is "essential in order effectually to protect property
rights against injuries otherwise irremediable"); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) ("It is a 'bedrock principle' of patent law that 'the claims of a patent
define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude') (citing Innova/Pure
Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir 2004); Alain A.
Levassear, The Boundaries of Property Rights: La Notion de Biens, 54 (supplement) AM. J.
COMP. L. 145, 157 (2006) (footnotes omitted):
A patent is also a personal property right (i.e. patrimonial right in the civil law
system) and is classified as incorporeal or intangible. A patent is granted to an
inventor for the invention or discovery of any 'new' and useful process, machine,
manufacture or any new and useful improvement on such process, machine ....
When approved, a patent vests exclusive rights in its owner for a period of 20
years from the date of filing.
61.
This was the view famously offered by Calabresi and Melamed. Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability. One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1972):
Whenever society chooses an initial entitlement it must also determine
whether to protect the entitlement by property rules, by liability rules, or by rules
of inalienability. In our framework, much of what is generally called private
property can be viewed as an entitlement which is protected by a property rule.
No one can take the entitlement to private property from the holder unless the
holder sells it willingly and at the price at which he subjectively values the
property. Yet a nuisance with sufficient public utility to avoid injunction has, in
effect, the right to take property with compensation. In such a circumstance the
entitlement of the property is protected only by what we call a liability rule: an
external, objective standard of value is used to facilitate the transfer of the
entitlement from the holder to the nuisance.
62.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839-41 (2006).

63.
Id. at 1840. This, of course, begs the question whether the district court purported to
apply the adequacy of the remedy at law as a "categorical" rule. The district court's opinion did
evaluate all of the four factors before concluding that a permanent injunction should not issue.
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc. 275 F. Supp.2d 695, 711-15 (E. D.Va. 2005), aff'd, F.3d
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006). This suggests that the court made a
factual determination that the patentee (MercExchange, LLC) would not practice the patent and
would thus receive a reasonable royalty as damages rather than lost profits. Because an award of
money damages would provide complete relief, it would hardly amount to an abuse of discretion
to deny an injunction in that setting. See infra notes 86-119 and accompanying text.
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Justice Thomas using the term "categorical?" Before we can answer
that question, we need to examine the concept of judicial discretion to
award equitable relief.
There is a point of collapse when courts speak of "equitable
jurisdiction" and discretion to award equitable relief. Traditionally,
the irreparable injury requirement was seen as jurisdictional which
made sense when law and equity were separate systems. 64 Equitable
remedies were also seen as discretionary; hence, a court of equity may
have the power to act, but may exercise its discretion not to act.65 The
law courts did not ascribe to this view on use of discretion. 66 With the
merger of law and equity into a single system, the historical
distinction between jurisdiction at law and jurisdiction in equity
makes little sense when the issue of jurisdiction is viewed as the
power to act. Jurisdiction is a matter of statutory grant that does not
. 67
distinguish between actions at law and actions in equity. To speak1
modernly of equitable jurisdiction means then that the elements
providing for equitable relief have been met, but that the court retains
discretion as to whether relief in equity will be provided in this case. 68
How restrictively or loosely discretion will be allowed becomes the
critical issue.69

64. LAYCOCK, supra note 26, at 370.
65.
David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 548 (1985)
("A court with jurisdiction may decide for a number of reasons to refuse equitable relief.").
66. James M. Fischer, The Concept of MandatoryJurisdiction,41 OHIO ST. L.J. 861, 86266 (1980) (noting that the concept of mandatory jurisdiction was recognized at common law,
even if the concept was not consistently applied).
67. For example, neither the grant of diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.§ 1332) nor federal
question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) turn directly on whether the claim was historically
recognized at law or in equity. The same is true for the Patent Act, The Sherman Act, ERISA,
etc. Today, the law-equity distinction is one of remedy and the decision-maker (judge or jury),
not jurisdiction. E.g., United States v. Am. Friends Serv. Comm., 419 U.S. 7, 11 (1974)
(discussing equity "jurisdiction" and "irreparable injury" in terms of availability of remedy
(injunction), not power of court); Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 507 (1959)
(discussing equity "jurisdiction" and "irreparable injury" in terms of party's right to trial by jury
or bench).
68.
FISCHER, supra note 14, § 22.
69. For example, on establishing a breach of contract a court of law will award the
plaintiff general damages as a matter of right and special damages as a matter of proof. FISCHER,
supra note 14, § 6.4; Dobbs, supra note 25, § 3.2. The plaintiffs claim to the equitable remedy
of specific performance is, however, constrained. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the
remedy at law (damages) is inadequate and the court must be persuaded that it is fair and just
under the circumstances to award specific performance.
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Courts traditionally have been vague about what it means to say
70
that the district court has discretion to grant or deny equitable relief
As the Chief
Justice noted in his concurrence, discretion is more than
"whim." 7 1 Unfortunately, the Chief Justice did not further elaborate as
to what discretion "is" as opposed to what discretion "is not.",72 In our
legal culture the concept of discretion is both praised and damned,73
but courts have consistently recognized the desirability and utility of
allowing some decisions to rest on judicial discretion rather than rule
of law. 74
To say, however, that a judge has discretion only begins the
analysis. What does the exercise of discretion entail? It is generally
recognized that discretion-based decision making requires that the
judge actually and actively consider the issue and reach a "reasoned"
resolution of the matter. 75 It is also recognized that discretion-based
decision-making confers on the judge more freedom to act; even if the
reviewing court disagrees with the decision reached by the judge, the
court will usually affirm the decision as long as the decision is
consistent with the sound exercise of judicial discretion. 6 Beyond this
point, however, consensus begins to break down. 7

70. See Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc. 741 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (discussing various meanings and usages of the term "discretion").
71.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
72.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841-42 (2006).
73.
The concern is that discretion leads to arbitrary distinctions. KENNETH CULP DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3 (1971) (suggesting that where law ends,
discretion begins, paraphrasing William Pitt's famous aphorism "where law ends, tyranny
begins"); cf Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive
Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Vatuation in Law), 107 YALE L. J. 2071, 2077 (1998)
("If similarly situated people - plaintiffs and defendants alike - are not treated similarly, erratic
awards are unfair.").
74. AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION, at x-xi (Yadin Kaufmann trans., Yale Univ.
Press 1989) (1987) (stating that discretion is inherent in any legal system and an asset to that
system); The Honorable Henry J.Friendly, IndiscretionAbout Discretion,31 EMORY L.J. 747,
762 (1982) (stating that discretion is a necessary part of a legal system but the exercise of
discretion must be guided and controlled to prevent misuse). Even Professor Davis noted that
discretion has some desirable and necessary attributes in the modem legal state: "Every
governmental and legal system in world history has involved both rules and discretion. No
government has ever been a government of laws and not of men in the sense of eliminating all
discretionary power. Every government has always been a government of laws and of men."
DAVIS, supra note 73, at 17.
75. This requirement is endemic to all judicial decision making. See HENRY M. HART, JR.
& ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 102 (Cambridge tent. ed. 1958).
76. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164 (1988) ("Other district courts might have
reached differing or opposite conclusions with equal justification, but that does not mean that
one conclusion was 'right' and the other 'wrong."'); United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d 862,
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To recognize that an initial decision maker, such as the district
court, has discretion over the resolution of a particular point, such as
the awarding of injunctive relief, puts particular emphasis on the
standard the court of appeals selects to review that discretion-based
call. Discretion comes in gradients and how rigorously the decision is
reviewed is necessarily linked to how much discretion the district
court actually has.78 Courts of appeal have developed multiple
approaches in this area, sometimes exercising strict review,
sometimes not. 79 It is important to note that the eBay decision did not
address the standard of review in this area; thus, lower courts retain
significant freedom, notwithstanding eBay, to tailor the standard of
review to the felt needs of the situation. By exercising a close scrutiny
of, or restrained glance at, the district court's decision to grant or deny
a permanent injunction, courts of appeal80 can effectively control the
remedy available for patent infringement.
By recognizing the inherent open-endedness of discretion-based
decision making, one can appreciate what the term "categorical"
877 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (noting that the abuse of discretion standard
does not constitute approval of practice or choice found not to be an abuse of discretion), rev'd,
514 U.S. 669 (1995)..
77.
It should also be recognized that to say that the judge should engage in a "sound
exercise of discretion" does not really say much. It is not the case that in actions at law the judge
is free to render "unsound" decisions. The underlying idea is one that is difficult to capture in
print. A sound exercise of discretion is decision-making based on an actual consideration of the
facts of the case, the settled principles of law, and the equities of the case that the parties bring
to the court. While at law the court's remedial decisions are said to be more confined by legal
rule, which is to say dictated by precedent; in equity the idea is that precedents guide but do not
dictate. The overarching principle in equity is to do justice based on the facts of the case rather
than the legal rules that a law court would apply to those facts. The distinction remains
fundamental and elusive, but it is a difference nonetheless.
78. See Maurice Rosenberg, JudicialDiscretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above,
22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 650-52 (1971) (noting four levels of discretion ranging from weak
to strong).
79.
Compare Guaranty Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ryan, 928 F.2d 994, 998 (11th Cir. 1991)
("We review the district court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion, but if the court misapplied the law in making its decision we do not defer to its legal
analysis."), with Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, 686 F.2d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1982)
(stating that the court in reviewing the district court's decision to grant or deny a preliminary
injunction would review de novo whether the district court identified the correct legal standard,
but would not substitute its judgment for the district court as to whether the legal standards were
correctly applied).
80.
James M. Fischer, "Preliminarily"Enjoining Elections: A Tale of Two Ninth Circuit
Panels, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1647, 1664-65 (2004) (noting that the appellate court's standard
of review of a district court's decision regarding preliminary injunctions is to nominally apply
an abuse of discretion test to the trial court's decision granting or denying preliminary injunctive
relief, but to apply an abuse of discretion standard if the district court misapprehends the law or
the facts).
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means as used by Justice Thomas. 8 1 In exercising discretion the court
should do just that, not avoid weighing the competing demands
presented by the traditional four-part test in favor of an overarching
rule. The Court did not proscribe a district court from finding on the
facts that the remedy at law was adequate in cases of patent
infringement and denying an injunction on that basis 82 - a district
court cannot, however, presume or deem the remedy at law to be
adequate across-the-board. That ruling will pose little deterrence
when a district court believes an injunction is an inappropriate remedy
in a case of patent infringement. In other words, while the Court in
eBay closed the door on the principle that damages are always or
never adequate as a matter of law (the "categorical" approach), the
Court clearly left open the opportunity for a district court to find that
"damages" in the particular case are adequate or inadequate. 83 The
Court's opinion in eBay will not preclude a lower court from finding
either way what the lower court believes is the correct result. All the
court has to do is phrase the resolution as resting on individual facts,
rather than categorical principles.84

81.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
82. Id.at 1841.
83. Id.
84. See z4 Tech., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp.2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006)
(declining to award injunction notwithstanding jury finding of patent infringement). The district
court relied on comments in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC
that injunctive relief would not be appropriate when the patent that is infringed is but a minor
part of the infringer's process. Id. at 441. This decision is significant because z4 actually
practiced the patent; yet, the district court found that the remedy at law was adequate because
z4's losses could be monetized and calculated with no substantial difficulty. Id. at 440-41. The
district court also found that the balance of hardship if an injunction was issued would favor the
defendant (Microsoft) not z4 because Microsoft would incur substantial cost and product delay
were it required to design around z4's patented process. Id. at 444. Moreover, if Microsoft
simply 'turned off' the patented process, this might cause the market to be flooded with pirate
versions of its product. Id. The district court also agreed with Microsoft's argument that public
policy favored denial of an injunction because of the impact the injunction would have on
Microsoft's retail sellers and consumers. Id. at 444. It should be noted that these "balance of
hardship" and "public policy" arguments that the district court found persuasive are gardenvariety claims that any infringer can make when an injunction is threatened. Cf Abbott Labs. v.
Andrx Pharm., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed Cir. 2006) (vacating preliminary injunction based on
disagreement with the district court that patentee established likelihood of success). In Abbott
Laboratories.the majority extensively revisited the legal claims and gave no apparent deference
to the district court's decision - a position criticized by the dissenting judge. Id. at 1349
(Newman, J., dissenting). The majority cited eBay Inc. for the general proposition that the
availability of injunctive relief for patent infringement is committed to the district court's
discretion as amplified by the four-part test. Id. at 1334. The dissent cited precedents supporting
deference to the district court's exercise ofjudicial discretion. Id. at 1348-53. There is nothing in
the decision, however, to suggest that eBay Inc. had any significant impact on the outcome. A
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The Court's decision in eBay, although presented as a unanimous
decision by the Court, is sufficiently terse, pithy, and fractured by the
two concurrences as to provide some support to practically any
conclusion one wishes to draw from the decision. At the minimum,
the Court held that the awarding of injunctive relief for patent
infringement should be done on a case-by-case basis through the
85ThCorr
application of equity's traditional four-part test. The Court rejected a
categorical rule either in favor of, or opposed to, the awarding of
injunctive relief in this context. 86 The very limits of Justice Thomas's
opinion for the Court, 87 coupled with the two divergent
concurrences,8 8 suggest an underlying broader vision - that district
courts may use the discretion granted to them to award or withhold
injunctions to advance the substantive policies of the Patent Act.
The question of whether patent rights are asserted in socially
undesirable ways has been extensively debated. Much of the initial
attention to the granting of certiorari in the case of eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange L.L.C. was over the prospect that the Court would
recalibrate the existing preference that favors patentees and thus
patent trolls. 89 Although the Court did not use the case as an occasion
to address that larger point, all three opinions in eBay, when read
together, suggest that district courts could deny patentees the leverage
that injunctive relief provides by finding that, on the facts, the remedy
at law was adequate. 90 This would not only limit the patentee to a
damages award, it would require the patentee to prove its actual lost
profits or accept a reasonable royalty. 9'
The problem of patent abuse can be addressed by redefining the
patentee's rights through the patent grant. Besides being enormously
listing

of

decisions

applying

the

eBay

approach

is

available

at

http://www.thefireofgenius.com/injunctions (last visited July 29, 2007).
85.

eBay, 126 S. Ct at 1841.

86.

Id. at 1840-41. This suggests that the presumption in favor of granting a permanent

injunction on a finding of infringement (see supra note 5 and accompanying text) should not be
followed; rather the patentee must establish its entitlement to an injunction as a matter of law
and fact.
87. Id. at 1838-41.
88.

Id. at 1841 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 1843 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

89.
90.

See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text; see also infra note 117.
eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1838-43.

91.

Unlike the Copyright Act, the Patent Act does not provide for statutory damages on

proof of a violation. The plaintiff is entitled to a substantial array of remedies, including
enhanced damages in cases of willful infringement. CHiSUM, supra note 5, § 20.03[4][b]

(discussing availability of augmented damages for willful patent infringement).
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contentious, a restatement of rights risks being overly generous or

overly parsimonious. If patent trolls present a problem today, it is in
part due to the manner in which patent rights are defined. A
restatement of those rights to cure the problem supposedly caused by
patent trolls could result in a different and larger set of problems yet
unforeseen. Rather than embarking on a journey into uncharted
territory, the Court may have felt more comfortable using remedy
law, particularly its casting of the injunction as a discretionary relief,
to allow district courts to fine tune the remedy to the felt needs of the
case. What then might those "felt needs" be?
Justice Kennedy's concurrence noted the problem of patent
abuse. 92 While all of the opinions rejected a Calabresian approach to
injunctive relief that would tie the equitable remedy to the patentee's
property right (i.e., right to exclude), Justice Kennedy also expressed
concern that, in some cases, allowance of injunctive relief would be
economically inefficient:
[A]n injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from
its violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge
exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy licenses to practice
the patent. When the patented invention is but a small component
of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations,
legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
93
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence expressed concern over the
abusive use of patent rights to leverage unjustifiable economic rents
by the threat of injunctive relief, which would require the defendant to
quit the business or pay to play.94 The concurrence situated this
concern in the public policy factor of the traditional four-part test
rather than the irreparable injury factor. 95 Whether this is significant
or not is difficult to say; when articulated as a "public policy"
consideration rather than an "irreparable injury" consideration, the
concern has a broader, more "categorical" impact. The "irreparable
injury" factor is usually case specific; public policy usually speaks to
larger concerns. In this sense it may also be significant that Justice
Kennedy's concurrence did not situate the concern in the "balancing
of hardships" factor, which is also used to accommodate the interests

92.

eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

93.
94.
95.

Id. at 1842.
Id. at 1842-43.
Id. at 1842.
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of non-parties in the grant or denial of injunctive relief, but, because
its focus is on specific third parties, tends to be more case-by-case and
thus less categorical. 96 The balancing of hardships factor can also be
lost when a court finds that the defendant acted in bad faith or without
due regard for the plaintiff's rights. 97 Placing the concern in the public
policy factor preserves the concern against loss by the defendant's
inequitable conduct. Moving the concern of abuse of patents (or
"misuse" depending on one's point of view) from substantive doctrine
to remedy doctrine enables district courts to engage in the fine-tuning
that several commentators
have suggested would be an appropriate fix
98
law.
patent
to current
Rather than redefining patent rights, a focus on the remedy for
patent infringement allows the district court to reserve injunctive
relief to those cases when an award of monetary damages would not
compensate the patent holder for the real losses caused by the
infringement in the past and future. 99 A remedy focus also allows the
district court to address other problems that a less protective view of
patentee rights might engender. For example, if injunctive relief
becomes less likely, infringers may be encouraged to bargain in bad
faith for licenses. In particular, when an infringer's profits dwarf the
damages they must pay for their violation of the patentee's rights, an
infringer would be in a superior bargaining position knowing that the
patentee will likely be limited to a damages proof l°° Giving the
district court discretionary control over the remedy for patent
infringement permits the court to use injunctive relief, or at least the
96.
Public policy concerns come close to categorical statements, which the Court read out
of the analysis in the main opinion authored by Justice Thomas. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1838-41.

Situating a concern in the public policy category allows a court to invoke the concern as a
reason for ruling as it does without stating that the concern is a categorical imperative.

97. FISCHER, supra note 14, § 33.2.
98. Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What to Do about Bad Patents?,
28 REGULATION 10 (2005-2006) (arguing that availability of "presumption of validity" that
attaches to patents approved by the Patent Office should be tied to applicant's willingness to pay
for the actual cost of an exacting examination of the novelty of the invention).
99. See infra Part VI (discussing how injunctive relief should be calibrated to advance the
remedial goals of the Patent Act).
100.

See generally George F. Pappas, Damages and Remedies For Patent Infringement,

SL025 ALI-ABA 119, 121 (2005) ("Upon finding for the claimant the Court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made ... by the infringer together with interest and costs .... )
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000)). Id. at 121. The Court's decision this term in Medimmune Inc. v.
Genentech may also discourage claims for injunctions as licensees may prefer to pay and litigate
as a plaintiff rather than infringe and litigate as a defendant. Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
127 S. Ct. 764 (2007) (holding that licensee may challenge validity of patent while continuing to
pay royalties to patentee).
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threat of the remedy, as a Damoclean sword to encourage good faith
bargaining by the infringer over licensing rights.
As noted earlier, many commentators harbor distaste for
discretion because it runs against the prime directive of legal regimes
that like cases be decided alike.' 0 That concern only applies if
discretion is misapplied. In theory, discretion permits a court to more
closely match the facts of the dispute to the correct resolution.
Admittedly, this leaves much to the individual views of the decision
maker as to the "correct" result - the proverbial "Chancellor's
foot.' 1 2 In some cases however, the unpredictability of discretionbased decision-making may outweigh the perceived benefit of
categorical based decision-making. Discretion emphasizes several
values that a legal system may deem important such as the avoidance
of second-guessing, the marshaling and conservation of judicial
capital, and responsiveness to the individualized aspects of a
controversy. In a discretion-based remedial regime, a court may
identify important factors that compete with each other and which
cannot all be satisfied. Courts then are delegated in every single case
the responsibility of weighing and measuring the competing factors to
achieve a just and correct resolution of the particular dispute.
Emphasizing the discretionary nature of injunctive relief also enables
courts to reconcile the providing of injunctive relief with the damages
remedy provided by the Patent Act. It is to this point that we now
turn.
VI.

COORDINATING THE STATUTORY GRANT OF DAMAGES AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT

Damages and injunctive relief are both generic remedies that
operate to restore plaintiffs to their rightful position, which is the
position a plaintiff would have occupied but for the wrong. When the
plaintiff has suffered a loss or harm, this restorative feature of each
remedy is well established and accepted in the law and most

See supra notes 21, 68-70 and accompanying text.
Equity is a roguish thing:
For law we have a measure, know what to trust to; equity is according to the
conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is
equity. 'Tis all one, as if they should make his foot standard for the measure we
call a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be! One
Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot; 'tis the
same thing in the Chancellor's conscience.
Gee v. Pritchard, 36 Eng. Rep. 670, 679 (1818) (quoting JOHN SELDEN, TABLE TALK 43
(Frederick Pollock, ed., 1927) (1689)).
101.
102.
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commentary. 10 3 Yet an added consequence of wrongdoing by the
defendant may be gain to the defendant.' 0 4 When a defendant's gain
from its wrong is equal to (or less than) the plaintiffs loss, the
plaintiff has little incentive to examine a "gain-based" recovery.
When however, the defendant's gains exceed the plaintiffs losses, the
plaintiff has an incentive to capture the gain as a remedy for the
defendant's wrongdoing.' 0 5 Under prior versions of the Patent Act,
restitution of the infringer's profits was an accepted remedy
that was
06
thought to be fully consistent with equitable principles.1
The Court addressed this issue of capturing the infringer's profit
in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. 107 The
Court found that the current version of the Patent Act did not continue
the prior practice allowing restitution.108 Does the Court's conclusion
103.
In the view of some commentators the concern should be less over redressing the
harm sustained by the plaintiff than devising remedies that provide suitable signals that
encourage socially desirable conduct. Compensating injured plaintiffs is not an end, but simply a
means to another end - public welfare in general. Richard Craswell, Against Fuller and Perdue,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 99, 106 (2000):
It is possible, of course, to disagree on the merits with Fuller and Perdue's
claim that the reliance interest presents a stronger claim for protection than does
the expectation interest. I will do some of that here, but my deeper concern is
with the kind of normative argument that Fuller and Perdue believed was relevant
to their claim. I argue below that Fuller and Perdue's appeal to Aristotle (and to
corrective and distributive justice) is not a useful way of thinking about remedies
for breach of contract.
Even more fundamentally, I also argue that the very classification employed
by Fuller and Perdue - their famous distinction between the restitution, reliance,
and expectation interests - is not a useful starting point for normative analysis. To
most modem scholars (as to Fuller and Perdue), remedies can be defended only
by reference to some purpose or policy they might serve.
(footnote omitted).
104. Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1767,
1783 (2001); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, ch 5, topic 1,
introductory note (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005).
105. In some contexts, the plaintiff may claim both restitution and damages, but those
contexts involve statutory grants or claims raising multiple causal arguments, neither of which is
applicable here. DOBBS, supra note 25, § 4.5(5) (discussing principle reasons against combining
both remedies and noting some exceptions when reasons for not combining do not apply).
106. See Bancroft v. Acton, 2 F. Cas. 578 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1870) (No. 833).
107. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964). See also
CHISUM, supra note 5, § 20.02[4] (discussing the elimination of the patentee's remedy of
restitution of the infringer's profits). Although the critical part of the opinion finding that the
1946 revision eliminated the remedy of restitution of the infringer's profits was only joined by
four of the nine Justices, the position has been accepted as established. Id. at § 20.02[4][c]
(criticizing reasoning but noting that "[s]ubsequent lower court decisions have ... given
precedential effect to Ara H Part IV") (footnote omitted).
108. Aro, 377 U.S. at 506-08. There is a statutory exception for "design" patents, which
permits recovery of the infringer's profits. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2000)
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in Aro Manufacturing, that the Patent Act does not allow for
restitutionary relief (i.e., stripping the infringer of its profits), cast any
illumination on the proper use of injunctive relief in cases of patent
infringement, particularly in light of the Court's focus in eBay on
judicial discretion to award injunctive relief?
Injunctive relief may be seen as a complement to restitution in
that it provides a means by which the plaintiff may preclude the
defendant from reaping (or continuing to reap) gains from its
wrongful conduct. The strongest case for injunctive relief is when the
patentee is or will soon be practicing the patent. In that context, the
injunctive relief protects and preserves the patentee from harm the
patentee would otherwise sustain, but should not. Absent the
injunction, the infringer will utilize the patent to compete in the same
market as the patentee and cannibalize profits the patentee would
have realized in that market. When the patentee practices the patent,
an injunction barring infringement of the patent protects the owner's
right and ability to exploit the patent for profit.
What if the patentee does not practice the patent? In this context,
the infringer's gains from its infringement do not reflect an equivalent
loss or harm sustained by the patentee.109 Granting injunctive relief
forces the infringer to bargain for a license, the cost of which will be
somewhere between patentee's anticipated losses and infringer's
anticipated gains. The patentee has no economic interest in trading
rights to injunctive relief for a sum less than it will receive as
damages for infringement, which is a reasonable royalty. The
infringer has no economic interest in purchasing immunity from the
injunction for more than it could make exploiting the patent.
Principles of Pareto-efficiencyl 0 require that the bargain improve the
party's position, not reduce it, since otherwise no rational party will
agree to the bargain."' In this context, the injunction mirrors the
restitution remedy - in the sense that it permits the patentee to capture

109. Under the Patent Act the patentee can recover damages, which include either a
reasonable royalty or lost profits. The infringer's profits may be used to measure the patentee's
lost profits, but that is not the same as disgorgement, which is barred. Kori Corp. v. Wilco
Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649, 655 (Fed. Cir. 1985). This practice is
commonplace in the law, although it is scrutinized by courts to insure that the award is truly the
patentee's lost profits not the infringer's actual profits.
110. Robert H. Mnookin, Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of
Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2003).

111.

Id.

26

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 24

a portion of the infringer's profits - except that112it leaves the allocation
of the gain to the parties rather than the court.
11 3
The Patent Act does expressly allow for injunctive relief.
Should the Act be read and applied to permit injunctive relief to serve
as a surrogate for restitution, i.e., as leverage to capture a share of the
infringer's profits over and above what would constitute a reasonable
royalty? The Patent Act is silent on this point. There is a reasonable
argument that injunctive relief should be allowed based on the Court's
argument in Aro Manufacturing barring restitution of the infringer's
profits. A basis for the Court's rejection of restitution was language in
the legislative history suggesting congressional concern over the
difficulties and complexities of the use of an "accounting for profits"
to fix the amount the infringer should surrender as restitution. 1 4 An
injunction avoids the "difficulties and complexities" and permits the
15
parties to bargain for an allocation of the gain between themselves.'
On the other hand, the focus of the Court's analysis in Aro
Manufacturing was on the use of the term "damages" in the Patent
Act. The Court distinguished between the patentee's damages and the
infringer's profits, holding that the term "damages" permits recovery
of the former, but not the latter. 1 6 Should the additional grant of
injunctive relief be read as complementing the allowance of
"damages," i.e., permitting an injunction barring future or continuing
infringement to protect the patentee's right to a reasonable royalty or
profits? Alternatively, should injunctive relief be seen as independent
of "damages," i.e., permitting the patentee to use an injunction to
protect its right of exclusive use and as leverage to extract a portion of
the infringer's anticipated profits as the cost to of a license? This issue
would have been critical had the Court in eBay proceeded to consider
the continuing vitality of Continental Paper Bag,1 17 but the Court's

112. From a coasean perspective the parties should reach an agreement within the
bargaining range because it will leave each party better off than if the injunction issues, the
infringer complies with the injunctive, and the patent is not practiced. The critical issue is
whether the court should assign a legal entitlement to the patent holder (the right to an
injunction) that provides leverage to the patent holder to obtain some of the infringer's profits,
over and above a reasonable royalty.
113.

35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000). See also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text

(discussing question of automatic grant of statutory remedy of injunctive relief on proof of
statutory violation).
114.

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964).

115.
See generally CHISUM, supra note 5, § 20.02[4] (discussing 1946 revision of the
Patent Act and Aro Manufacturing Co.).
116.

Aro, 377 U.S. 476, 507.

117.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C, 126 S.Ct. 733 (2006):
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avoidance of reconsidering ContinentalPaper Bag does not eliminate
the question of the scope of injunctive relief available under the
Patent Act.' 18 If anything, the issue becomes critical because of the
importance the Court assigned in eBay to the use of judicial discretion
in deciding whether to grant or withhold an injunction in cases of
established infringement.
Reading the Patent Act as treating "damages" and "injunctions"
as complementary remedies designed to protect the patentee from
injury would appear to be a reasonable interpretation and well within
a court's discretion. Under that approach, injunctive relief would be
more appropriate when the patentee practiced the patent than when
the patentee would simply license its use." 19 Calculating damages for
lost profits when the patentee practices the patent is a daunting and
complex task.120 Treating the legal remedy as inadequate in this
setting is well recognized and accepted.' 21 Calculating a reasonable
royalty is a less daunting and complex task although admittedly not
simple. 2 2 In this latter setting, the case for irreparable injury is

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit granted. In addition to the Question presented by the petition, the
parties are
directed to brief and
argue the
following question:
"Whether this Court should reconsider its precedents, including Continental
PaperBag Co. v. Eastern PaperBagCo., 210 U.S. 405 [28 S. Ct. 748,52 L. Ed.
1122] (1908), on when it is appropriate to grant an injunction against a patent
infringer."
118.

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840-41 (2006):
[The] categorical rule [attributed to the district court's .decision denying
injunction for lack of irreparable injury] is also in tension with ContinentalPaper
Bag Co. v. Eastern PaperBag Co.... which rejected the contention that a court
of equity has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief to a patent holder who has
unreasonably declined to use the patent.

119.
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelly Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)
("Normally, if the patentee is not selling its product, by definition there can be no lost profits.").
120.
The patentee must demonstrate that "but for" the infringement it would have realized
profits, Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545, which means there is a demand for the patented invention,
there are no non-infringing substitutes, and the patentee can meet demand for the patented
invention. Pappas, supra note 100, at 123-29. In addition, the patentee must provide a
reasonable method of quantifying the lost profits, which means the patentee must demonstrate
the amount of lost sales, its profit margin relative to those lost sales, the impact of the
infringement on related products (e.g., the patentee uses the patented invention in other products
it sells and those sales have declined as a'result of the infringement), etc. Id. at 132-38. See also
CHISUM, supra note 5, § 20.03[l] (discussing patentee's recovery of profits lost due to
infringement).
121.
FISCHER, supra note 14, § 21.2.3 (Problems in Measuring Legal Remedy).
122.
If the patent holder licenses the patented product, those transactions presumptively
establish the market rate. Mobile Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 915 F. Supp. 1333, 1353 (D.
Del. 1994) ("Courts and commentators alike have recognized that the royalties received by the
patentee for the licensing of the patents in suit is the 'most influential factor' in determining a
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weaker and the court may reasonably find that damages calculated by
the court or jury would adequately compensate the patentee and fully
redress the wrong.
VII. CONCLUSION
Denying injunctive relief to victims of patent infringement is not
without problems. It permits what is euphemistically referred to as
"private eminent domain" 123 to the infringer when the patentee does
not wish or is unable to practice the patent. 124 Yet patent law has
always been a dynamic system that seeks to balance the right of
exclusive use that accrues to patentee with the larger societal goals of
encouraging innovation and productive use of science and technology
for the public good. The right of exclusive use (the limited monopoly)
is itself justified as a means of encouraging innovation, but any value
or good can be "loved too much" and care must be taken to ensure
that the rights of the patentee are balanced against the larger public
good.
The approach of the Court in eBay recognizes this inherent
balancing that applies to all legal rules and rulings. The Court avoided
treating injunctive relief as an entitlement, or even preferred remedy,
as it has in other cases of statutory violations. 125 All of the Justices
accepted that the remedy of injunctive relief upon establishment of an
126
infringement remained a matter of judgment rather than of right.
The disagreement among the Justices centered on how judgment
should be exercised, not whether it would be exercised. 127 The critical
issue then after eBay is how should discretion be exercised.
reasonable royalty."). The more difficult (and more typical) case involves a patentee who does
not (or has not) licensed the patented invention. In this case, the dominant test is the
hypothetical license, i.e., what would a willing patentee accept and a willing licensee pay in an
arms length transaction for the right to use the patented invention. See State Indus., Inc. v. MorFlo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. PlywoodChampion Papers, Inc., 318 F.2d 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971)
(setting forth multifactor test for determining reasonable royalty); CHISUM, supra note 5, §
20.03[1][b] (discussing Georgia-Pacificfactors); Pappas, supra note 100, at 140-41 (noting test
and describing Georgia-Pacificas "often cited").
123.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.9 (3d ed. 1986); cf A.

Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and
DamageRemedies, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1075 (1980).
124. This is an example of the "holdout" problem - the party "whose position allows her
to exact above market" compensation because her participation or agreement is necessary for a
venture to proceed. Calebresi & Melamed, supra note 61, at 1106-07.
125. FISCHER, supranote 14, § 33.2. See also supranotes 31-34 and accompanying text.
126. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1838-43 (2006).
127. Id. at 1840-43.
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The Chief Justice's concurrence emphasized the need that the
exercise of discretion be principled. 128 Limiting injunctive relief to
cases when damages ("lost profits") are difficult to prove is fully
consistent with the overwhelming authorities on this point. 29 Not
awarding injunctive relief when the plaintiffs legal remedy is
adequate, results in the case when the patentee's remedy will be a
reasonable royalty, e.g., damages.
Limiting injunctive relief to prevent the patentee from capturing
the infringer's profits is also consistent with both concurrences. The
limitation is based on the settled precedent that restitution of the
infringer's profit was not carried over in the current version of the
Patent Act when Congress revised it in 1946.' 30 The courts have
adhered to that interpretation since its pronouncement in Aro
Manufacturing in 1964. 131 Justice Kennedy's concurrence emphasized
the need to prevent injunctive relief from creating greater mischief
than the remedy was supposed to redress. 132 Limiting injunctive relief
to cases when the patentee practices the patent prevents courts from
having their process used to leverage above market rents, which is the
case when otherwise the patentee would recover only a reasonable
royalty for the use of the patent.
The Court in eBay professed to simply reconfirming the use of
the traditional test for injunctive relief to cases of established patent
infringement.' 33 Notwithstanding that sentiment, the larger meaning
and use of eBay will likely see a substantial reduction in the granting
of injunctions when the patentee does not practice the patent. This
may embolden infringers to bargain hard when negotiating licenses.
The lessened availability of injunctive relief, however, will not affect
the availability of enhanced damages for cases of willful
infringement' 34 and hard bargaining will continue against that
possible consequence.
Id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
FISCHER, supra note 14, § 21.2.3.
See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see generally
CHISUM, supra note 5, § 20.02[4][c] ("Though Part IV ofAro H was only a plurality opinion for
four Justices and arguably constituted dictum, it caused a shift in the course of lower court
decisions.").
132. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1842-43 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128.
129.
130.
131.

133.

Id. at 1838.

134. The Patent Act permits the trebling of damages (reasonable royalty or lost profits) if
the infringement was willful. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000). Traditionally, "willfulness" meant the
infringer lacked a reasonable basis for believing it could act the way it did. CHISUM, supra note
5, § 20.03[4][b]; Pappas, supra note 100, at 147-49. Recently, however, the Federal Circuit

30
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overruled past precedent and raised the threshold for finding "willfulness." In re Seagate Tech.,
LLC, No. 830, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 19768, at *22-23 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 20, 2007) (en banc)
("[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent").

